In the early 80's, there was a number of papers on what should be called proofs by consistency. They describe how to perform inductive proofs, without using an explicit induction scheme, in the context of equational speci cations and ground-convergent rewrite systems. The method was explicitly stated as a rst-order consistency proof in case of pure equational, constructor based, speci cations.
nal semantics, or, for possibly non-Horn speci cations E, perfect model semantics or the class of all (minimal) Herbrand models.
In this paper we address the issue of inductive proofs in this broad sense: we wish to de ne general methods for (semi-)automatically (dis)proving the validity of conjectures C in classes of Herbrand models of E, where C and E are sets of universally quanti ed clauses. In order to minimize user expertise, we do not want to require the user of such a (semi-)automatic inductive theorem prover to provide explicit induction schemes. Instead, induction will be based on simple, automatically generated, well-founded orderings on terms, like the recursive path ordering Der82] . This is what distinguishes our approach from the explicit induction methods that will not be addressed in this paper.
Theory imposes severe limitations on our aims. Unlike it happens when proving standard rst-order consequences (i.e., validity in the class of all models), from G odels incompleteness theorem it follows that in general there are no complete proof systems that can be used to enumerate all inductively valid formulae, and hence inductive validity is not even semi-decidable. In Section 3 we will show that this is the case even for validity of equations in the initial model of very restrictive classes of speci cations E, like the ones presented by purely equational, convergent, linear, right shallow, constructor-based term rewrite systems, or by a convergent set of length-reducing word rewrite rules. This shows why almost no decidability results for inductive validity exist in the literature: even in very restricted and simple situations the problem remains undecidable. To our knowledge, the only decidability results are for !-complete theories, i.e., where (for in nite models) the inductive theory coincides with the equational theory, like the shallow equational theories of CHJ94] or the Catalog Horn theories of Nie96].
However, under reasonable assumptions it is possible to obtain what we will call refutation complete procedures for inductive validity: procedures that provide in nite time a disproof for any conjecture that is false in M. Then the situation is exactly reverse|but probably less useful in practice|to what happens in standard rst-order logic, where all formulae valid (in the class of all models of E) are provable in nite time.
It is interesting to observe that refutation completeness for inductive validity amounts to refutation completeness for ground conjectures: a conjecture C is valid in M if, and only if, all its ground instances are valid (since M is a class of Herbrand models) and one can simply enumerate (representatives of) all ground instances until a ground counterexample is found by the ground refutation procedure. This simple idea is in essence the basis of methods like the ones of Red90, Zha88, BR95, Nie99] 1 . Indeed refutation procedures or decision procedures for ground conjectures are available in many practical settings, like in the presence of a convergent term rewrite system or an adequate saturated clausal presentation for E.
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Of course we do not mean that these methods were designed only with the purpose of refuting false conjectures, or that they can only detect ground counterexamples; but the fact that all ground instances are explored (or covered ) is required for soundness of their validity proofs.
In fact, if M includes all minimal Herbrand models of E (and hence, in particular, if M is the initial model of E), then refutation completeness for ground conjectures C, i.e., the co-semi-decidability of M j = C, is equivalent to the decidability of M j = C. This is true because M j = C is semi-decidable as well: since M includes the minimal models, for every ground atom A we have M j = A if, and only if, E j = A (that is, A is a rst-order logical consequence of E), which is semi-decidable 2 .
Our techniques will extensively deal with refutation completeness, among other reasons because a procedure that makes progress towards a disproof when given a false conjecture, frequently also advances towards a proof when given a valid conjecture. In the class of methods described in this paper, progress is made by inference rules reducing (with respect to ) counter examples, i.e., false ground instances c of a conjecture c. Once a minimal (irreducible) counter example appears, it is detected by other means. Here we build upon previous work on proofs by consistency for the purely equational case, formerly also called inductionless induction methods, where minimal counter examples were detected in several forms, like equations true = false Mus80] , equations between constructors HH82], or ground irreducible non-trivial equations JK86, Bac88, BL90], among others. We generalize those methods for the detection of inconsistencies by introducing the notion of I-axiomatization. These axiomatizations will be used in a uniform framework for proof by consistency that allows us to eliminate many restrictions on syntax and semantics (saturatedness requirements on E, arbitrary universal formulae, more general redundancy notions and classes of models). The explicit use of axiomatizations was introduced in Fri84] for equational speci cations with free constructors, but not further generalized in subsequent papers.
An I-axiomatization is a set A of rst-order formulae such that A E C is consistent if, and only if, M j = C. Such I-axiomatizations hence allow us to reduce inductive proofs to rst-order consistency proofs, which in turn makes it possible to apply general-purpose rst-order theorem provers to inductive validity problems.
Note that we do of course not require A to completely axiomatize M, which is impossible in general.
The issue of how to compute I-axiomatizations automatically will be treated in Section 7. The other main question to be answered is of course how to design e cient 3 procedures (i) proving the inconsistency of A E C whenever C is false, and (ii) proving its consistency in as many cases as possible if C is valid. 2 Ganzinger and Stuber GS92] state that if validity of ground conjectures is not decidable, \inductive theorem proving is hopeless anyway". But in fact refutation completeness (rather than inductive theorem proving) becomes hopeless in that case only if M includes all minimal Herbrand models of E, which is not true in their setting. Their perfect model is only one of the minimal models and hence a (rather hypothetical, however) co-semidecision procedure for ground validity would su ce for obtaining refutation completeness. 3 The meaning of the word \e cient" here is of course relative to the context in which it is used. In particular the opposition between \matching based" and \uni cation based" proof methods is not relevant here since the problem is the termination of saturation rather than each individual deduction step.
The remainder of this paper is devoted to this in a number of di erent situations, depending on the intended semantics and the syntactic properties of E and C. An important step forward is a completeness result for the following two-stage approach which is common to our di erent strategies: on the one hand, new consequences are computed from E C in a restricted way; on the other, each new consequence is checked for inconsistency with A. The latter can be done either by a standard rstorder prover or by a dedicated |in some cases, decision|procedure (see Section 8).
In Section 4 we rst concentrate on the case where E is Horn, M is the minimal Herbrand model, and C is any set of clauses. The results are hence directly applicable to the case where M is the class of all Herbrand models if C contains only positive clauses. Di erent special cases of constructor-based speci cations are handled separately in Section 5. In Section 6 we generalize these ideas to non-Horn E and perfect model semantics.
This paper does not contain many di cult new results; its contributions are more at the conceptual level and several proofs are actually adaptations of standard proofs. We show however how inductive validity can be reduced to rst-order consistency, without the usual assumptions of the proofs by consistency method. The main advantage is that any saturation-based general-purpose rst-order theorem prover can be used for inductive validity. For instance, we experimented with Saturate NN93, GNN95] for this purpose. On all (small-sized) examples we tried, this experiment was quite successful. We reproduce some of the Saturate proofs in the paper.
Basic Notions and Notations
We use the standard de nitions of DJ90]: T(F; X) (T (F)) is the set of (ground) terms over a set of symbols F and a denumerable set of variables X (over F), the subterm of t at position p is denoted tj p , the result of replacing tj p by s in t is denoted t s] p , and syntactic equality of terms is denoted by .
A multiset over a set S is a function M: S ! IN. , where denotes the strict subterm ordering. A well-known, easily automatizable reduction ordering that is adequate for the purposes of this paper is the recursive path ordering (RPO), which is based on a total ordering F (the precedence) on F. Furthermore let F be the disjoint union of two sets lex and mul, the symbols with lexicographic and multiset status, respectively, and let = mul denote the equality of terms up to the permutation of direct arguments of symbols with multiset status.
Then RPO (with status) on ground terms is de ned as follows.
such that S fsg mul rpo S 0 ft 1 ; : : : ; t n g whenever S is equal to S 0 up to = mul and s rpo t i for all i in 1 : : : n. In this section we assume a nite signature F, and that E is a nite set of Horn clauses (the axioms), C is a set of clauses (the conjectures), I is the minimal Herbrand model of E, and we address the question whether I j = C. Finally, let be a total reduction ordering on T (F).
For simplicity, we can assume as well that equality is the only predicate symbol, since (positive or negative) atoms P(t 1 : : : t n ) can be expressed as (positive or negative) equations P(t 1 : : : t n ) = true, where true is a new special symbol and P is considered as a (boolean) function symbol. Indeed, if I 0 is the resulting minimal Herbrand model, then clearly for every ground atom A it holds that I j = A i I 0 j = A = true (note, however that I and I 0 are not isomorphic since two ground atoms that are false in I need not be in the same congruence class of I 0 ). In what follows, when P is a predicate symbol, we only allow equations (resp. disequations) of the form P(s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) = true (resp. their negation) which will be sometimes abbreviated as P(s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) (resp. :P(s 1 ; : : : ; s n )). In other words, equations of the form P(s 1 ; : : : ; s n ) = Q(t 1 ; : : : ; t m ) are ruled out by our syntax. This will be always consistent with ordering strategies, if we assume true to be the smallest term, which we will do in the rest of the paper. In other words, an I-axiomatization must contain enough negative information to rule out all non-minimal Herbrand models of E, or, equivalently, it must ensure the well-known concept of \no confusion". As we mentioned before, in Section 7 we will extensively explain how to automatically derive I-axiomatizations. Let The following key proposition allows us to reduce the problem of proving inductive theorem to the consistency of a nite set of clauses:
Proposition 7 Let A be an I-axiomatization. Then A E C is consistent, if, and only if, I j = C. Proof: If I j = C, then I j = A E C, and hence A E C is consistent. Conversely, if the set A E C is consistent, then it has a Herbrand model, as it is a set of purely universal formulas. Now, by the second property of I-axiomatizations, De Non-ground versions of these rules are de ned as usual. For example, by equality resolution on ?; s = t ! , the conclusion ? ! is obtained if is the most general uni er of s and t and s can indeed be the maximal term of (?; s = t ! ) for some ground (the latter condition is decidable if is some recursive path ordering; otherwise, approximations are used and some more inferences than needed may be computed). Also, the usual restriction in non-ground superposition that sj p must be non-variable applies here. It is also possible to further restrict the amount of inferences by working with constrained formulae, inheriting the generated uni cation and ordering restrictions as constraints NR95].
Redundancy and Saturation
We now use multiset extensions for lifting the ordering on terms to an ordering on ground equations and clauses. Let C be a ground clause, and let emul(s = t) be fs; tg if s = t is a positive equation in C, and fs; s; t; tg if it is negative. Then we de ne the ordering e on (occurrences of) ground equations in a clause by e e e 0 if emul(e) mul emul(e 0 ). Similarly, c on ground clauses is de ned C c D if mse(C) ( mul ) mul mse(D), where mse(C) is the multiset of all emul(e) for ocurrences e of equations in C. When clear from the context, we will sometimes write instead of e and c . If c is a ground clause and S is a set of clauses, we denote by S c the set of all ground instances of clauses of S that are smaller than c (w.r.t. ). De nition 10
1. An theorem proving derivation is a sequence of sets of clauses S 1 ; S 2 ; : : : such that each S i+1 is obtained from S i either by adding to S i a logical consequence of S i or by removing from S i some clause that is redundant in S i . 2. A clause is persistent in the derivation if for some j it belongs to all S k with k j.
3. A derivation is fair if every inference with persistent premises is redundant in S j for some j.
Lemma 11 ( BG94]) Let S 1 ; S 2 ; : : : be a fair theorem proving derivation. Then the set of persistent clauses is saturated and logically equivalent to S 1 .
Model Generation
If E is consistent and saturated under superposition and equality resolution then the following construction produces a model R for E (remind that R demotes the congruence T (F)= =R ) BG94]. The construction proceeds by induction on c :
De nition 12 An instance C of the form ? ! l = r of a clause in E generates the rule l ! r if 1. R C 6 j = C, 2. l r, and (l = r) e e for all equations e in ?, 3. l is irreducible by R C where R C is the set of rules generated by all instances D of clauses in E such that C c D. We denote by R the set of rules generated by all ground instances of E.
Theorem 13 ( BG94])
The ground TRS R is convergent. Furthermore, if E is saturated under superposition and equality resolution then either 2 2 E or else T (F)= =R is a model for E, i.e., E is consistent. More precisely, I is (isomorphic to) T (F)= =R .
From this theorem, clearly a term (or a clause) is normal if, and only if, it is
in normal form with respect to R. Similarly, we will call a ground substitution normal (or irreducible by R) if x is normal (or irreducible by R) for all x 2 Dom( ).
Conjecture Superposition
Let us assume from now on that E is saturated under superposition and equality resolution. In Section 5.2 we will show how this requirement can be weakened in many cases. We now de ne conjecture superposition, a form of superposition where the leftmost premise is always a (de nite) Horn clause of E and the rightmost premise c is a conjecture in C:
conjecture superposition: Note that in this inference rule there are strong ordering restrictions on the leftmost premise, the clause of E, but only a weak ordering restriction on the conjecture clause c has been imposed so far. Furthermore, here we have given the standard non-ground version of this inference rule, but again it is possible to apply constraint inheritance. For example, the basicness restriction can be imposed, i.e., no inferences are needed on terms introduced by uni ers of previous inferences generating ancestor conjectures (see NR95, BGLS95] for the details).
Inductive Redundancy and Saturation
We now give de nitions for the redundancy of conjectures and of induction superposition inferences. They roughly coincide with the ones given above, except that here they include the use, without any ordering limitations, of formulae that are known to be valid in I. Proof: If there is some c in some C j such that A fcg is inconsistent, then I 6 j = C 0 , since all such c are logical consequences from E; A; L; C 0 and I j = E; A; L.
For the reverse implication, assume A fcg is consistent for all c in i C i and that I 6 j = C 0 . We will derive a contradiction from the existence of a minimal (w.r.t.
) ground instance c of a clause c in i C i such that I 6 j = c . If c is redundant in some C j then from the de nition of redundancy of conjectures, it follows that there is some false instance of a conjecture in C j that is smaller than c , contradicting the minimality of c . Otherwise c is persistent. By Lemma 8, c is not a normal clause (otherwise A fcg would be inconsistent). Furthermore, we can assume that is normal, since otherwise is reducible by R into some 0 such that I 6 j = c 0 and c c 0 ,
contradicting the minimality assumption on c . Hence c is reducible by some rule in R at some skeleton position, i.e., a position p in c. Let c r ] p . By fairness, this conclusion is redundant in some C j . But then from the de nition of redundancy of inferences, it follows that there is some false instance of a conjecture in C j that is smaller than c , contradicting the minimality of c . 2
More re ned orderings
Up to now, for reasons of simplicity, we have considered only an ordering on ground terms and clauses. However, in some redundancy proofs it is convenient to consider more re ned orderings. In particular, subsumption cannot be handled by the redundancy notions de ned up to now; for example, the equation f(a) = b is not redundant in the presence of the equation f(x) = b. 
Complete sets of positions
The only requirement for Theorem 18 to hold is that enough conjecture superposition inferences are computed in order to reduce the smallest false conjecture instance. In many cases, it is possible to determine, by analysis of a clause c, whether there is some subset P of the positions of c such that for all reducible (by R) c where is normal, c j p is always reducible for some p 2 P. In this case, we will call P a complete set of positions for c (and the given E). In such a situation, it clearly su ces to compute conjecture superposition inferences only at the positions in P.
This generalizes a number of notions de ned in the literature for the case where E is purely equational, like the ones of Fri86, K uc89]. The development of techniques for nding small complete sets of positions in our setting is related to the techniques of Section 7. In the case of a constructor discipline, described in the next section, the notion of complete set of positions will be especially useful.
Selection strategies
From, e.g., BG94] it is known that, for rst-order theorem proving, superposition remains complete with selection: in each clause c an arbitrary negative literal can be selected and the only inferences involving c are superpositions and equality resolution steps on this selected literal.
For the purpose of proving inductive validity, conjecture superposition remains complete with selection as well, provided we add equality resolution on selected literals in conjectures. In the following, in each conjecture clause c (the rightmost premise), a negative literal may have been selected: Then there is no further user interaction.
Let gr be a predicate symbol denoting the strict ordering on natural numbers de ned by constructors 0; s. The conjecture is the transitivity of the ordering. Note that a user-guided negative literal selection strategy is used, and that a normal Iaxiomatization could be simply the one of example 6. 
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This is a bit annoying since in the classical proof by consistency for the equational case, only superpositions on the maximal side of the equations are considered. This is because in the classical approach the axiomatization has stronger properties, which in our setting can be generalized as follows:
De nition 22 A is a strongly normal axiomatization if I j = A and, moreover, for all ground terms s; t such that s is minimal in its congruence class, s t and I 6 j = s = t, we have A j = s 6 = t.
Note that in strongly normal axiomatizations we not only require A j = s 6 = t when s and t are distinct normal terms, like in normal axiomatizations, but also when s is normal and s t. Actually most I-axiomatizations of section 7 are strongly normal.
Lemma 23 Every strongly normal axiomatization is normal, and hence it also is an I-axiomatization.
Proof: This follows from the totality of the ordering on ground terms.
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If the conjecture superposition rule is restricted to inferences on maximal sides of conjecture literals only, we obtain a new de nition of induction derivation (let us call it restricted induction derivation) of which the classical inductive completion methods are an instance. And we still have the analog of theorem 18:
Theorem 24 If A is a strongly normal axiomatization and C 0 ; C 1 ; : : : is a fair restricted induction derivation, then I j = C 0 if, and only if, A fcg is consistent for all clauses c in i C i .
The proof requires only a slight modi cation of the proof of theorem 18.
Constructors
Usually, the structure of a speci cation with Herbrand model semantics can be seen as a set of constructor symbols F 0 axiomatized by a set E 0 , to which (repeatedly) the complete de nition of a new symbol has been added. For example, one can specify the natural numbers with constructors 0 and s, then de ne + in terms of 0 and s, then de ne in terms of the 0; s; +, then exp in terms of 0; s; +; , etc.
More formally, along this section we assume the following setting. Let F = F 0 D. F 0 is a non-empty set of constructor symbols and D is a set of de ned symbols. We assume that E 0 is a saturated subset of E built over T (F 0 ; X). Terms in T (F 0 ; X) are called constructor terms. The constructors are called free if E 0 is empty (or consists of only tautologies). De ned symbols will be denoted by f 1 ; f 2 ; : : :.
We will assume that terms in T(F 0 ) are always smaller in the ordering than terms in T(F n F 0 ). This is easily achieved in gerneral-purpose orderings like LPO or RPO, for which it su ces to de ne the precedence on symbols in such a way that f g for every f 2 D and every g 2 F 0 . In addition, we will assume that E is su ciently complete, that is, for every ground term s there is some ground constructor term t such that E j = s = t.
This speci cation method is very general and, at the same time, convenient for our proof techniques for three main reasons. First, if A is a normal I-axiomatization for E 0 , then it is one as well for E, since the normal terms are constructor terms. In the particular case of free constructors, A simply states that constructor terms are di erent. Second, by enriching in this way a saturated set E 0 with the de nition of a new symbol, usually the resulting set E 0 will be saturated as well. If this is not the case, we can still apply our techniques in many cases, as shown in Subsection 5.2. The third reason is explained in the next subsection: one can restrict the conjecture superposition inferences to a smaller subset of positions.
Constructors and complete sets of positions
In this subsection, in addition to the constructor-based setting, we assume E to be saturated. As we mentioned before, for Theorem 18 to hold we need enough conjecture superposition inferences in order to reduce the smallest false conjecture instance. Since, by su cient completeness, all ground terms headed by a de ned symbol f must be reducible by R, we have the following result:
Lemma 25 If p is an innermost occurrence of a de ned symbol f in a conjecture c, then P = fp p 0 j p p 0 is a position of cg is a complete set of positions. Now suppose it is known that, for some de ned symbol f, all terms of the form f(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) are reducible at the topmost position if the arguments t i are constructor terms. Then the set fpg is already a complete set of positions if cj p is such a term f(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ). In most speci cations, this is indeed the case, since, in order to ensure su cient completeness, the axioms de ning f are usually precisely written like this. would yield to a tautology, whereas the conjecture is false (f(g(a) ) ! f(a) ! a).
In practice, it is usually easy to determine for each de ned symbol f whether all f(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) with constructor arguments are reducible at the topmost position or not, and hence, whether fpg is complete or the weaker result of Lemma 25 has to be applied.
In practice, when computing a derivation, when and how is an innermost de ned symbol of a conjecture c selected for determining a complete set of positions P? A practical implementation includes a mechanism for ensuring fairness, that eventually obliges every (apparently) persistent conjecture c to be considered for inference computation. Selection of P for a conjecture c can be done at the moment c is going to be considered for superposition or before. This can be done automatically, by some heuristic, or by user interaction.
Dropping saturatedness: reductive de nitions
Su cient completeness is an undecidable property even for nite convergent string rewrite systems KNZ87]. For convergent TRS where ful lls the aforementioned requirements, decidability can be recovered: then the property of su cient completeness is equivalent to the ground reducibility of f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ), where the x i are pairwise distinct variables, for every de ned symbol f JK89].
But this result does not provide a means to e ectively construct su ciently complete speci cations, and in cases where the result does not apply, like when E is not saturated, su cient completeness has to be ensured in some other way.
The following is a standard method to do this, by axiomatizing each de ned symbol f in such a way that all ground terms containing f are, in a certain general sense, reducible, but without any saturatedness requirement. Below we show that this more general notion of reducibility will su ce not only for obtaining su cient completeness, but also for the applicability of our techniques for inductive theorem proving in non-saturated E. De nition 28 Let E be a (possibly non saturated) constructor-based speci cation where E = E 0 E 1 is a set of Horn clauses.
Furthermore, assume that for every ground term s of the form f(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) where t j 2 T (F 0 ) for j 2 1 : : : n and f 2 D, there is some clause in E 1 with an instance ? ) l = r such that E j = ?; l = s, l is headed by f, and s (?; r). 
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We believe that most practical cases of su ciently complete non saturated specications can be covered by this notion of reductive de nition. For instance, consider the following example from KZ95]. It is interesting because for the authors it is supposed to illustrate the weakness of the proof by consistency approach. The cause of this problem is that Theorem 18 requires every counterexample to be reducible, which is not the case for gcd(x; x) = 0, whose minimal false instance gcd(s(0); s(0)) = 0 is not reducible by E. However, a more careful analysis reveals that this problem does not appear if the false conjecture has some subterm of the form gcd(x; y) where x and y are distinct variables. Then, for every instance gcd(s; t) of it there exists an equivalent instance gcd(s 0 ; t 0 ) that is reducible to some r such that gcd(s; t) r, which su ces for Theorem 18. These ideas lead us to the following.
De nition 31 A de nition pattern is a term of the form f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) where f is a de ned symbol and x i and x j are distinct variables for 1 i; j n where i 6 = j.
Lemma 32 Let E be a reductive de nition and let c be a conjecture such that cj p is a de nition pattern.
Then for every ground instance c where is normal, there exists some inference by conjecture superposition at position p with a conclusion c 0 , and a normal substitution 0 such that I 6 j = c implies I 6 j = c 0 0 , and furthermore, c c 0 0 .
Proof: Let cj p be f(x 1 :::x n ) and let s be f(x 1 :::x n ) . By De nition 28, there exists an instance c 2 _ l = r of a clause c 1 in E 1 such that E j = l = s, l is headed with f, and s (c 2 ; r). Furthermore, since is normal, l s r. Hence there exists an inference of c 1 on c, whose conclusion has an instance of the form c 2 _ c r] p with the desired properties.
2 From Lemma 32, it is clear that if cj p is a de nition pattern, then fpg is something similar to what we called before a complete set of positions of c. Indeed, below we will see that it plays the same role. As a consequence, in the remainder of this section we assume that every conjecture c has a selected position p(c) (or simply p) such that the symbol at cj p is an innermost de ned symbol.
De nition 33 An induction derivation C 1 ; C 2 ; : : : is reductively fair if for every persistent conjecture c the term cj p is a de nition pattern and every conjecture superposition on c at p is redundant in C j for some j.
Theorem 34 Let A be a normal I-axiomatization. Let Proof: We again replicate the proof of theorem 18, but now without using the saturatedness property, which was used for showing that if c is not normal then c is reducible by R. The purpose of this was to show that, for non-normal c such that I 6 j = c , there is a conjecture superposition yielding a smaller false conjecture.
However, this part can be replaced with the result of lemma 32 and the rest of the proof is the same.
The previous theorem leaves us with the problem of how to achieve reductive fairness when a certain conjecture c appears such that c has no de nition pattern and c cannot be proved redundant either. Hence this kind of derivation may fail.
In order to completely avoid failure, instead of requiring reductive fairness, we now slightly generalize the inference rule of conjecture superposition that handles The proof is the same as for theorem 34, replacing lemma 32 with lemma 37. Inference by conjecture superposition of 3 on 8 gives: 9 : conje x1=gcd(0,x1)
Inference by conjecture superposition of 4 on 8 gives: 10 : conje x1=gcd(x1,0)
Inference by conjecture superposition of 5 on 8 gives: 11 : conje gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(x1+x2,x1)
Inference by conjecture superposition of 6 on 8 gives: 12 : conje gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(x2,x1+x2)
Clause 9: x1=gcd(0,x1) is redundant by instances: 4 : axiom gcd(0,x1)=x1 clausal rewrite proof:
by 4 we get x1=x1
Clause 10: x1=gcd(x1,0) is redundant by instances: 3 : axiom gcd(x1,0)=x1 clausal rewrite proof:
by 3 we get x1=x1
Clause 11: gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(x1+x2,x1) is redundant by instances: 7 : lemma x1+x2=x2+x1 6
: axiom gcd(x1+x2,x2)=gcd(x1,x2) 8 : conje gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(x2,x1) clausal rewrite proof:
by 7 we get gcd(x1,x2)=gcd(x2+x1,x1) by 6 we get gcd(x2,x1)=gcd(x1,x2) by 8 we get gcd(x2,x1)=gcd(x2,x1) Example 41 Without any lemmas, we now prove gcd(x; x) = x, which by abstraction becomes: 7 : conje x1=x2 -> gcd(x1,x2)=x1 1 : axiom 0+x1=x1 2 : axiom s(x1)+x2=s(x1+x2) 3 : axiom gcd(x1,0)=x1 4 : axiom gcd(0,x1)=x1 5 : axiom gcd(x1,x1+x2)=gcd(x1,x2) 6
: axiom gcd(x1+x2,x2)=gcd(x1,x2) 7
: conje x1=x2 -> gcd(x1,x2)=x1
...
Inference by conjecture superposition of 3 on 7 gives: 8 : conje x1=0 -> x1=x1 (tautology)
Inference by conjecture superposition of 4 on 7 gives: 9 : conje 0=x1 -> x1=0 (tautology)
Inference by conjecture superposition of 5 on 7 gives: 10 : conje x1=x1+x2 -> gcd(x1,x2)=x1
Inference by conjecture superposition of 6 on 7 gives: 11 : conje x1+x2=x2 -> gcd(x1,x2)=x1+x2
Inference by conjecture superposition of 1 on 10 gives: 12 : conje 0=x1 -> gcd(0,x1)=0
Inference by conjecture superposition of 2 on 10 gives: The redundancy proofs of 13 and 18 are left out here, because they are quite long, although easy: for 13, instances s(x1) + x2 = s(x1 + x2) of 2 are used to enable the instance gcd(s(x1); s(x1) + x2) = gcd(s(x1); x2) of 5 and then create s(x1) = s(x1 + x2) ! gcd(s(x1); s(x1 + x2)) = s(x1) which is subsumed by 7. The redundancy proof of 18 is similar, using 6 instead of 5.
Non-Horn Axioms
It is well-known that if E contains some non-Horn axiom, then in general no longer a unique minimal Herbrand model exists. For example, if E fp _ qg then both the models fpg and fqg are minimal.
A total reduction ordering on ground literals provides a way to single out one of the minimal models, the so-called perfect model (of E and ). The perfect model is the minimal one with respect to the set extension ?1 set of ?1 . If E fp _ qg and q p then fpg ?1 set fqg and hence fqg is the perfect model (see BG91] for details).
In logic programming, the ordering is usually induced from the way non-Horn clauses are written: one positive atom is written in the head of the clause, and the other ones are written negatively in the tail. Local strati cation is too strong a condition for the existence of a perfect model, and it has been relaxed into weak strati cation, where, roughly, only ground instances contributing to the model need to ful ll the requirements PP90]. These ideas are generalized and extended to arbitrary clausal speci cations with equality in BG91]. There it is shown that the perfect model of E is precisely T (F)= =R , where R is the TRS generated by the saturation of E with respect to . Apart from the aforementioned inference rules of superposition and equality factoring, for non-Horn clauses rules for factoring and merging paramodulation are needed as well (see again BG91] for details).
If we assume that E is saturated under this inference system, our techniques for inductive theorem proving for Horn E given in the previous sections smoothly extend to the non-Horn case and perfect model semantics.
We consider normal terms, clauses, substitutions, and I-axiomatizations with respect to the perfect model, and normality in this sense coincides again with irreducibility with respect to R, the ground TRS generated by the saturated set of axioms E. The ordering restrictions for the inference rule for conjecture superposition are now slightly more complicated, since the left premise D _ l = r can now be non-Horn. In this case (for ground clauses; at the non-ground level this has to be expressed as explained in Section 4). one cannot require l to be the strictly maximal term anymore. Instead one can impose that l r and l u for all terms u occurring in negative equations in D, and l l 0 for all other positive equations l 0 = r 0 , and if l l 0 then r r 0 .
Theorem 42 Let I be the perfect model of a saturated set E, let A be a normal I-axiomatization, and let C 0 be any set of universal conjectures. Let C 0 ; C 1 ; : : : be a fair induction derivation with respect to non-Horn conjecture superposition. Then I j = C 0 if, and only if, A fcg is consistent for all clauses c in i C i .
The results of GS92] are closely related to our previous theorem. In both approaches, validity is proved by nite saturation, in our case under conjecture superposition, in their case, after an encoding by gnd predicates, by a larger set of inference rules with selection. They refer to perfect model semantics, as we do here, and also were the rst to state the close relationship between redundancy (de ned very similarly to the way it is done here) and inductive theorem proving.
But the methods are di erent in essence, however. We derive minimal counterexamples with respect to normal I-axiomatizations, whereas in GS92] counterexamples are required to be ground: it is assumed that validity of ground clauses is decidable, and essentially the saturation with their encoding by gnd predicates amounts to an enumeration of the ground instances of the conjectures. Hence their method is more similar to the methods of Red90, Zha88, BR95] which we mentioned in Section 1, than to proof by consistency.
Computing I-axiomatizations
In the previous sections, we designed inductive saturation methods, leaving two unanswered questions: 1. how is it possible to compute a (strongly) normal I-axiomatization ? 2. how do we derive (in)consistency ?
When the normal I-axiomatization is nite, it is easy to answer the second question: any saturation-based theorem prover can be used. We will see however that it is sometimes useful to consider in nite axiomatizations A, in which case we have to address the second question. That is what we do in section 8.
Concerning the rst question, we will see below how the work which has been done on proofs by consistency in equational theories can be reformulated in our framework: for instance, each of the procedures given in Mus80, HH82, Bac88, JK89], which were designed in a pure equational setting, is an inductive saturation procedure corresponding to some (implicit) I-axiomatization.
We give in sections 7.1 and 7.2 the axiomatizations corresponding respectively to Mus80] and HH82]. Then we sketch how I-axiomatizations can be computed when E is a set of Horn clauses without equality in section 7.3. Finally, we give a general I-axiomatization for an arbitrary saturated set of axioms (or an extension of it with su ciently complete de nitions) in section 7.4. However, such an I-axiomatization, though recursive, will be in nite; we delay the problem of (in)consistency proofs for such axiomatizations until section 8.
Musser's approach D. Musser in Mus80]
assumes that E is a convergent rewrite system such that there is a particular function symbol eq satisfying, for all terms s and t not containing true; false; eq, that eq(s; t) = E true , s = E t and eq(s; t) = E false , s 6 = E t.
Moreover, true and false are assumed to be irreducible.
This corresponds to a very simple I-axiomatization:
Lemma 43 With Musser's assumptions ftrue 6 = falseg is an I-axiomatization. Proof: I j = A as true 6 = E false as soon as the initial algebra is not trivial. If M j = E A, then, for any two ground terms s; t, if I 6 j = s = t, then the normal forms of s and t are di erent. It follows that E j = eq(s; t) = false, hence M j = eq(s; t) = false. Since M j = true 6 = false, M 6 j = eq(s; t) = true, hence M 6 j = s = t. Proof: I j = A follows from the assumptions. Ground terms that are minimal in their equivalence class are irreducible by convergence of E. Now, if s t and s is an irreducible ground term, then s 6 = E t, hence eq(s; t) = D false by hypothesis. Then A j = eq(s; t) = false, hence A j = s 6 = t. 2 Note that the de nition of eq needs not to be put inside E any more and that we do not need the property eq(s; t) = E true , s = E t. Actually, Musser's conditions imply that, roughly, there is an equational I-axiomatization. Huet and Hullot assume moreover that E is given by a convergent rewrite system and that pure constructors ground terms are smaller than terms which contain at least a de ned symbol. (Besides, every de nition of a symbol is supposed to be su ciently complete with respect to the constructors). Now we want to design a general procedure for the computation of (strongly) (normal) I-axiomatizations. For this purpose, we start with a known procedure for Horn-clauses without equality which we borrow from the logic programming area. The idea is to use a domain closure axiom to compute a set of Horn clauses which de nes the negation of the predicates. Such a computation is valid in the least xed point of the set of Horn clauses and is used in the \explicit negation as failure" Stu91].
The following is known as Clark's completion Cla78]: write every set of clauses whose head has a top predicate P as a single implication P(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) ( where x 1 ; : : : ; x n are variables and is a disjunction of conjunctions of the form 9ỹ:x 1 t 1^: : :^x n t n^B B being the body of the clause whose head is P(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ). In the least xed point of the set of clauses, the converse implication holds, hence, in this model, we have :P(x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) ( : Now, we may use a quanti er elimination procedure for the theory of nite trees and get a de nition of :P. (See e.g. Com91] for more details on the quanti er elimination procedures). The only weakness is that, if some clauses contain variables in the body which do not appear in the head, then universal quanti ers cannot always be eliminated. However, if this is not the case, then the result is an I-axiomatization.
Lemma 47 If we assume that all variables occurring in the body of the clauses also occur in the head of the clause, then the above procedure computes a strongly normal I-axiomatization for Horn clauses without equality.
Proof: (sketch) I j = A and A satis es E 6 j = P(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) = true if, and only if, A j = P(t 1 ; : : : ; t n ) 6 = true. Since true is the smallest term, this guarantees the strong normality property.
2
Example 48 Let us consider the most simple example of Horn clauses. A = fs 6 = t j s; t 2 T(F); :Red(s); s tg where Red is the predicate which holds true on ground terms which are reducible by the convergent ground rewrite system R of theorem 13.
Lemma 50 When E is nite and saturated, the above set A is a strongly normal I-axiomatization.
Proof: I j = A since, by theorem 13 and saturatedness of E, I is isomorphic to T(F)= = R and, by ground convergence of R, for every ground terms s; t, R j = s = t and s t implies that the normal forms of s and t are identical, hence s is reducible.
Let s be a minimal ground term in its equivalence class and t be a ground term such that s t and I 6 j = s = t. s is irreducible by minimality, hence s 6 = t 2 A, by de nition.
2 Of course, this result can be extended to nite sets of clauses E which are suciently complete w.r.t. a saturated subset E 0 .
(In)consistency proofs for A fcg
Our deduction procedure reduced the consistency of E A C to the consistency of each single conjecture c with A. It remains to explain how we (dis)prove such simple consistency results.
We have seen that there are simple nite normal I-axiomatizations for constructorbased speci cations. For such axiomatizations A, the consistency of A fcg is easily decided.
If we do not assume a constructor-based speci cation, we have still the normal axiomatization A of section 7.4. However, such a A is in nite, hence it cannot be computed in extension. Our purpose here is to show how such a set of axioms can be e ectively handled, by lifting the ground disequalities at a non-ground level and using again a general purpose consistency prover. Our rst concern is to show that existing methods for the pure equational case (e. Theorem 51 Let A be a normal (resp. normal, resp. strongly normal,....) Iaxiomatization. Let C 0 ; C 1 ; : : : ; C n ; : : : be a fair induction derivation (resp. fair induction derivation with selection, resp. fair restricted induction derivation, resp. reductively fair induction derivation, resp. fair induction derivation with respect to conjecture superposition with abstraction).
Then I j = C 0 if and only if, for every clause c 2 i C i and for every ground substitution , A fc g is consistent.
Indeed, in the proofs of the theorems, we only use the above weaker assumption.
Jouannaud and Kounalis approach
In this section we assume (as Jouannaud and Kounalis do JK86]) that E is a nite ground convergent rewrite system. The idea is to lift A from the ground to the non-ground level. :Red(x) , P(x) _ N(x) where is the syntactic equality on ground terms (whose negation can easily be de ned by a nite set of Horn clauses S : ).
Note that the rst axiom is not necessarily a consequence of the second set of formulas when s; t are not comparable at the non ground level. Similarly, the second set of formulas is not a consequence of the rst axiom since s may be both irreducible and strictly larger than a reducible term t.
Lemma 54 B fe cg is consistent i A fcg is consistent.
Actually, the same result holds if we remove either of the two rst lines in the de nition of B.
This improves over e A since, now, for every clause c, we can compute a nite subset B c of B such that B c fe cg is consistent i B fe cg is consistent: it su ces to restrict the second line in the de nition of B to the pairs of terms s; t such that s = t occurs in c. ( We may also simply not consider the second line in the de nition of B, but we keep it because, in case this clause applies, it will result in more e cient inconsistency proofs).
Another slight extension would consist in merging the two cases, considering the more elegant axiomatization: B 0 = f(eq(x; y)^x > y) ) Red(x)g S :Red S : S > (where S > is a de nition of ) of which all axioms in Bachmair's axiomatization would be a consequence. Again, the consistency of A fcg would be equivalent to that of B 0 fe cg. However, we know that the consistency of B fe cg is decidable, but the decidability of the consistency of B 0 fe cg is an open problem, even if the interpretation of > is an RPO.
The general case
For arbitrary Horn clauses with equality, the reducibility predicate can be de ned as in section 8.1. We need however the equality:
Red(s) ( s 1 = t 1^: : :^s n = t n^s > t for every clause s 1 6 = t 1 _ : : : _ s n 6 = t n _ s = t Red(f(x 1 ; : : : ; x n )) ( Red(x i )
Using the method described in section 7.3, we can compute an axiomatization (assuming that there is no variable occurring in the conditions which does not occur in the corresponding body). We get a nite set of clauses S r of the form :
:Red(s) ( s 0 1 6 = t 0 1^: : : s 0 m 6 = t 0 m^: Red(u 1 )^: : :^:Red(u k ) v 1 > w 1^: : :^v p > w p^x1 6 t 1^: : :^x q 6 t q using the totality of the ordering on ground terms. Now, we get an automaton with semantic constraints. In the pure equational case, we get an automaton with disequality and inequality constraints. If, moreover, every equation can be oriented we are back to an automaton with disequality constraints. Finally, if t t 1 : : : t n true we are back in the scope of the previous section.
Unfortunately, nothing guarantees in general that the semantic constraints can be eliminated. This is a problem: even if the theory in which the disequality constraints are interpreted is restricted to AC (associativity and commutativity), Red may be no longer recursive KNRZ91]. Even if there are no disequality constraints s 0 i 6 = t 0 i , Red is no longer recursive, as shown as a side result in CNNR98]).
Let B r be the set B of axioms, replacing S :Red with S r . Lemma 55 B r E fe cg is consistent if and only if for every ground substitution , A fc g is consistent.
As before, for every clause c, we only need a nite subset (known in advance) B r c of B r . Hence, together with theorem 51, we have the desired set of axioms.
However, this lemma is not fully satisfactory in general as, for the inconsistency proof, E has to be considered again. There are however several restricted classes for which the disequalities s 0 i 6 = t 0 i are not present in S r . In such a case, B 0 fe cg is consistent if and only if for every ground , A fc g is consistent. We give below two such examples, illustrating the bene ts of our general setting.
First when the negative literals in the clauses of E are always of the form s = true or s = false (i.e. Boolean equations), there is no disequalities in S r (hence no need for E in the previous lemma). This is illustrated in the next example. Example 56 This is a natural de nition of nite sets (of, say, natural numbers, but it does not matter here). Function symbols include ins (binary), ; (constant) and 2 (binary). 2 and ins are de ned by: 8 > < > :
ins(x; l) = l ( x 2 l x 2 ins(y; l) ( x 2 l x 2 ins(x; l) (the = true have been removed for the predicates de nitions). Note that there is no nite set of free constructors and that there is no purely equational speci cation.
The rst computation step gives a de nition of the membership predicate and of the reducibility predicate for lists: Another example which illustrates this method is the way AC symbols can be handled. Assume that the ordering on terms is a lexicographic path ordering and that + is associative and commutative. Let t be any ground term which is minimal in its equivalence class. A subterm of t which is headed by + has the following restricted syntactic form: +(t 1 ; +(t 2 ; : : : ; +(t n ; t n+1 ) : : :)) (i.e. it is a right comb) where t 1 ; : : : ; t n are not headed with + and t 1 : : : t n+1 . S r , which speci es the minimal terms in each equivalence class, is de ned accordingly. In general this yields a de nition of S r which does not contain disequalities, but may contain ordering 9 Conclusion and Future Work
The method of proofs by consistency has lost part of its popularity since it was developed in the early 80s. The main reasons are its requirements: pure equational speci cations (this is not true of some extensions such as in BL90] for Horn clauses), ground convergent presentations,... and its ine ciency, due to the divergence of completion.
Here we have generalized the technique, taking advantage of the powerful recent developments on saturation methods for rst-order theorem proving. This was possible because of the generalization of ideas already present in Fri84, KM87] for pure constructor systems: give explicitly a rst-order axiomatization which reduces inductive proofs to proofs by consistency.
Besides this generalization (the introduction of I-axiomatizations) we have shown how to generalize the proofs by consistency methods to Horn clauses and arbitrary clauses, taking advantage of ordered strategies, and we have also shown how to drop the ground convergence requirement for constructor speci cations.
Regarding future work, apart from studying further possible applications to other semantics like behavioural ones, we are seeking for more signi cant examples that could be automatized using the Saturate system, in order to investigate up to which degree the methods are automatizable, and how they compare with the other existing methods.
